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WASHINGTON'S COMPARATIVE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE APPELLATE REVIEW OF
DEATH PENALTY CASES UNDER THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
Abstract: In conducting mandatory comparative proportionality review of all cases in
which the death penalty is imposed, the Washington Supreme Court compares the defendant's case with similar cases to ensure that the penalty is being applied consistently. In
theory, the review promotes rational and non-arbitrary capital sentencing. In practice, the
review has not been effectively applied. Continued use of ineffective appellate review for
death sentences violates the Washington Constitution. This Comment explores the various problems associated with the review process, and proposes possible solutions.

Comparative proportionality review by appellate courts seeks to
achieve uniformity among capital sentences by comparing the case
being reviewed with similar cases, considering qualities of both the
crime and the defendant. The court assembles a pool of similar cases,
and determines whether imposition of a death sentence is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalties imposed in those similar cases.
The United States Supreme Court requires that states afford "super
due process" 1 before imposing the death penalty. Although the Court
has stated that comparative proportionality review can be a valuable
tool in limiting the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty, it has held
that comparative proportionality review of death penalty cases is not
constitutionally required. The Court has consistently refrained from
mandating any specific procedure by which a state can provide meaningful appellate review of death sentences. Two factors explain the
Court's reticence. First, the nature of death penalty adjudication does
not easily lend itself to specific and particularized procedure. Second,
the Court is unwilling to impose any procedures upon the states.
Although the Court assumes that comparative proportionality review
operates to ensure evenhandedness among capital sentences, it has not
examined substantive results to determine whether the process lives up
to its promise.
Since 1981, the State of Washington has required the Washington
Supreme Court to conduct a comparative proportionality review of
every death sentence imposed by a jury to ensure that the sentence
comports with federal and state protections against cruel and unusual
I. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ("super due process" requires heightened
attention to procedural fairness); see infra Section I.A.
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punishments.2 The Washington Constitution's prohibition against
cruel punishment may require that the comparative proportionality
review provide more than a theoretically effective procedure.' To comply with the state constitution, the statute must be effective as applied
to eliminate arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The current use
of the comparative proportionality review does not meet this standard.
As applied, the statute violates Washington's constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment.4
I.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: DOES
"SUPER DUE PROCESS" REQUIRE THAT
PROCEDURES BE EFFECTIVE?

The United States Supreme Court's decisions on capital punishment
procedure reflect a strong emphasis on heightened procedural fairness. 5 States may not impose the death penalty arbitrarily. 6 The
Supreme Court death penalty decisions, however, have not coalesced
to form coherent rules that states must follow to comport with federal
constitutional law. Thus, while the Supreme Court has required procedural safeguards, it has sent the states unclear signals as to what
safeguards to impose.
A.

"Super Due Process" in Death Penalty Cases Requires Appellate
Review

1. Furman v. Georgia
The Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia7 introduced the
concept of "super due process." 8 In Furman, the death penalty was
imposed under a system that left the choice of sentence to the unfet2. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch.
10.95 (1987)); see infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
4. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 14; see infra Section III (examining application of comparative
proportionality review).
5. For a Washington court's discussion of the United States Supreme Court death penalty
decisions, see State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 180-92, 654 P.2d 1170, 1175-82 (1982)
(Bartholomew I), vacated sub noma.Washington v. Bartholomew, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983).
6. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman and its companion cases, the state court imposed the
death sentence on a black defendant convicted of murder and on two black defendants convicted
of rape. For an insightful analysis of the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, see
Brennan, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Death Penalty' A View From the Court, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 313 (1986).
8. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Radin, Cruel
Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143
(1980) (discussing the philosophical and legal implications of "super due process").
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tered discretion of the judge or jury.9 The Supreme Court held that
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty violated
the eighth amendment of the federal Constitution. l °
In Furman, the Court demonstrated its increasing awareness of procedural fairness and equity,"' and indicated that, despite divisions
among the Justices on other issues, a majority of the Justices were
concerned with the seemingly random imposition of the death penalty. 2 Because death as a punishment is unique, the death penalty
necessitates unique treatment in its adjudication.' 3 This unique treatment-'"super due process"-requires that the death penalty be
imposed in a non-arbitrary way.

2. The Effect of Furman On the States
Furman set the standard for procedural due process in death penalty cases. 4 To comply with this higher standard, states were forced
to alter their individual statutes.' 5 The post-Furman death penalty

statutes reflect this growing attention to procedural protection.
Although individual states have adopted different procedures, all are

designed to limit the possibility of continued arbitrary infliction of the
death penalty. However, the Court has yet to go beyond the facial
validity of the statutes to determine whether, in their application, they
9. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). Each Justice filed a separate opinion in
Furman. The crucial opinions are those of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White. See State v.
Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 180-92, 654 P.2d 1170, 1175-82 (1982) (Bartholomew I)
(finding that the opinions of these Justices overturned the death penalties before them in Furman
without going so far as finding capital punishment absolutely prohibited by the eighth
amendment), vacatedsub nom. Washington v. Bartholomew, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983).
10. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); see alsoBartholomew , 98 Wash.
2d at 182, 654 P.2d at 1176.
11. Furman represented a sharp departure from a case decided the previous year. In
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court held that juries were free to impose the
death penalty without standards or guidelines for imposition, and that in doing so, no provision
of the Constitution was breached. Furman reached the opposite conclusion. Furman, 408 U.S. at
245-48 (Douglas, J., concurring).
12. See, eg., Furman, 428 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.").
13. d at 289 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The unusual severity of death is manifested most
clearly in its finality and enormity. Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself.").
14. Furman represented more than an enlightened approach to capital sentencing. The
Furman ruling also spared the lives of the more than 600 convicted felons who were then facing
death sentences. These sentences were subsequently changed to life imprisonment. See S. DIKE,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1982).
15. Furman struck down the capital punishment laws in 39 states, as well as in the District of
Columbia. Furman,408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Washington's statute was struck
down in Smith v. Washington, 408 U.S. 934 (1972). For a listing of the additional states, see B.
NAKELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 26 n.61 (1987).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 64:111, 1989

yield less arbitrary results than those reached under pre-Furman
statutes. 16
Washington's capital punishment statute was adopted as a response
to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Furman and its progeny." Thus far, the Washington Supreme Court has upheld the statute as meeting minimum federal constitutional standards.'" The court
has, however, focused its attention on trial level procedures, 1 9 and has
not yet addressed the effectiveness of its comparative proportionality
review procedure.
B. Facial Validity and "Super Due Process": Pulley v. Harris
2 0 the Supreme Court held that comparative
In Pulley v. Harris,
proportionality review is not an indispensable element in a state's capital
sentencing statute under the United States Constitution. 2' The Court
held that the eighth amendment does not require a particular type of
16. In 1976, the Court reviewed three post-Furman statutes. In each of them, the Court
limited its review to the facial validity of the statutes. The Court failed to analyze whether the
statutes were effective in curbing arbitrary death penalty sentencing. For general analysis of the
post-Furman statutes, see Browning, The New Death Penalty Statutes: Perpetuatinga Costly
Myth, 9 GoNz. L. REV. 651 (1974).
The Court upheld Georgia's statute, revised in light of Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). While the Court focused most of its attention on the trial procedure, it also approved
of Georgia's inclusion of mandatory comparative proportionality appellate review. Id. at
204-06. Also, the Court was careful to note that Georgia's scheme was only one of a myriad of
possibilities, and that it was still possible for a state to adopt seemingly acceptable standards
which would later be found to be inadequate. Id. at 195 n.46. Georgia's new statute provided
the model for Washington's death penalty statute.
Florida's revised statute was upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The
requirement that the trial judge validate the death sentence in a written statement met the
Court's requirement of meaningful appellate review. Id. at 250-52.
Texas's revised statute was reviewed in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court
validated the Texas plan even though its discretionary sentencing and appellate review were less
standardized than those in Georgia and Florida. Id. at 276.
17. Washington's capital punishment statute, adopted in 1981, is designed to limit the
arbitrary use of the death sentence, both at the trial and appellate levels. Act of May 14, 1981, ch.
138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 10.95 (1987)).
18. See, e.g., State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 724-26, 718 P.2d 407, 427-28, cert. denied, 479
U.S. 995 (1986); State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 423-26, 717 P.2d 722, 737-38, cert. denied,
479 U.S. 922 (1986).
19. See, e.g., State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) (Bartholomew
II) (limiting the admission of evidence of aggravating circumstances offered at the special
sentencing proceeding).
20. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
21. Id. at 44-45. In Pulley, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced to death in
California for first degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. Id. at 39 n.1. The defendant
asserted that California must conduct a comparative proportionality review, but the Supreme
Court disagreed. Id. at 53.
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appellate review.22 In refusing to validate a particular means of appellate review, the Court expressed a willingness to allow states to choose
any method which appears valid on its face.23

The California statute examined in Pulley provided minimal appellate review and no comparative proportionality review.24 The Court
asserted that other elements of the statute, such as the procedures
designed to guide the jury's discretion, resulted in a constitutionally
valid scheme.2 5 - What was crucial was that California's statute provided a mechanism which would achieve the desired result of an objectively applied penalty.2 6
C.

"'SuperDue Process" Does Not Yet Require That Review Be
Effective

By relying on a facial analysis of the death penalty statute, and
refusing to scrutinize the practical application of the process, the Pulley ruling leaves open the possibility of a further challenge to the
appellate review process.27 As with its decision in Furman, the

Supreme Court in Pulley did not address the difficult issue of whether
appellate review must be actually effective before the death penalty

may be constitutionally imposed.28 Thus, it remains to be seen how
22. Id. at 44-45. The eighth amendment prohibits, among other things, the imposition of
"cruel and unusual" punishment. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. In reaching the conclusion that no
particular type of appellate review is required in death penalty cases under the eighth
amendment, the Court in Pulley substantially relied on its 1976 cases upholding various states'
post-Furman death penalty statutes. See supra note 16 (examining three post-Furman capital
sentencing statutes).
23. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 54-59 (Stevens, J.,concurring). Justice Stevens, in his concurring
opinion, highlighted the dispute over exactly what sort of appellate review, if any, the Court had
mandated in its earlier decisions. Justice Stevens pointed out that while the Court had refrained
from insisting on a particular type of review, it had held consistently that "some form of
meaningful appellate review is constitutionally required." Id. at 54.
24. CAL PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1978) (providing for automatic appeal
and review of evidence where the jury returns a sentence of death and the trial judge affirms the
sentence), as cited in Pulley, 465 U.S. at 52-53.
25. California law charges the jury to find special aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in the defendant's case, whereby the defendant becomes subject to a penalty of death, or life
without parole. Id § 190.2, as cited in Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51 n.13. These circumstances must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and are reviewable during the appeal stage. Id. § 190.4(a),
(e), as cited in Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51-53.
26. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-51 (finding that Gregg, Proffit and Jurek did not establish
comparative proportionality review as a constitutional necessity).
27. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in Pulley. He claimed that the
Court's cursory analysis of the California procedure created a situation where the death penalty
could continue to operate in an arbitrary fashion, but would do so under the guise of rationality.
Id. at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Justice Brennan argued that upholding the statutes on their faces was not sufficient to
comply with Furman. Without determining whether the results reached under the statutes were
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the Court will rule when a state which has imposed upon itself an
affirmative duty to conduct certain procedures, such as comparative
proportionality review, fails to apply those procedures in a meaningful
manner.
II.

WASHINGTON LAW: THE THEORETICAL IDEAL

A.

Death Penalty Sentence Review Under the Washington
Constitution

While the United States Supreme Court has been deferential in its
examination of death penalty statutes, the Washington Supreme Court
need not follow the same trend. The Washington Supreme Court is
the ultimate arbiter of the Washington Constitution. 9 The United
States Supreme Court will not disturb state court decisions which rest
solely on state law. 30 State constitutions often provide greater protections than the federal Constitution.3 1 As long as the state constitution
grants the minimum amount of protection guaranteed by the federal
constitutional provision, the state is not barred from providing additional protection.3 2
Article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution prohibits the
imposition of cruel punishment.3 3 The Washington Supreme Court
devoid of Furman inconsistencies, Justice Brennan argued that the majority had little basis for its
conclusion that the statutes were constitutional. Id. at 67.
29. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution does not control the
Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the Washington Constitution. See Olympic
Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418, 421-22, 511 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1973)
(Supreme Court rulings on the fourteenth amendment do not control the state supreme court's
interpretation of its own due process clause).
30. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (decisions which are based on
separate, adequate, and independent state grounds are unreviewable by the Supreme Court); see
also State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 644, 683 P.2d 1079, 1087 (1984) (Bartholomew II)
(applying Long in an interpretation of article I, § 14 of the Washington Constitution). For a
general treatment of the independent and adequate state grounds issue, see Utter, Swimming in
the Jaws of the Crocodile:State Court Comment on FederalConstitutionalIssues When Disposing
of Cases on State ConstitutionalGrounds, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1025 (1985).
31. The expansion of individual rights under state constitutional interpretations has been well
documented. See generally Symposium: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L.
REv.959 (1985).
32. State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 859, 620 P.2d 999, 1000-01 (1980) (allowing for
an expanded right to counsel under state rules); State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 392-93, 617 P.2d
720, 723 (1980) (allowing a claim based upon article I, § 14 of the Washington Constitution, even
where the claim could not be based upon the eighth amendment); Federated Publications, Inc. v.
Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 56, 615 P.2d 440, 443 (1980) (expanding the defendant's right to a fair
trial).
33. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel punishment inflicted."). The Washington provision differs from the eighth amendment
to the federal Constitution which states "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

Washington's Comparative Proportionality Review
has held that where a trial lacks fundamental fairness and results in
the death penalty, the punishment violates article I, section 14.34 The
Washington Supreme Court, in applying the state constitution, could
require the appellate review procedures to be effective as applied, even
though the United States Supreme Court has not required such a
determination to be made under the federal Constitution. If Washington's comparative proportionality review has not been effective as
applied, to provide a meaningful safeguard against arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty, the court could refuse to
sustain the constitutionality of the procedure notwithstanding its theoretical effectiveness.
B.

Washington's Death Penalty Statute

Adopted in 1981, Washington's current capital punishment statute
is a product of the United States Supreme Court death penalty decisions.3" Under Chapter 10.95 of the Revised Code of Washington,3 6
aggravated first degree murder is the only crime punishable by
death.3 7 Aggravated first degree murder is defined according to a list
of aggravating circumstances.3 8 Imposition of the death penalty is not
mandatory when a defendant is convicted of aggravated first degree
murder. 39 The prosecutor must first seek the death penalty.' If the
defendant is convicted of aggravated first degree murder and the prosecutor has sought the death penalty, the jury then must determine
whether mitigating circumstances warrant a lesser sentence. 41 The
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth
amendment applies to the individual states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-68 (1962).
34. State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 640, 683 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1984) (Bartholomew
II) (holding that state constitutional provisions regarding both due process and cruel punishment
were violated by WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060 (1987), which regulates admissibility of
evidence in capital cases).
35. See supra note 17.
36. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch.
10.95 (1987)).
37. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (1987).
38. Id. § 10.95.020 (listing aggravating factors, which include murder of a judge, murder
pursuant to a contract, and murder committed to conceal commission of a crime).
39. Id. § 10.95.030.
40. Id. § 10.95.040.
41. Id. § 10.95.060. The sentence is imposed as the result of a special sentencing hearing. Id.
§§ 10.95.050-.060. At this hearing, the jury is asked: "Having in mind the crime of which the
defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not
sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?" Id. § 10.95.060(4). Thus, the jury
considers the relative weights of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If the jury finds
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statute provides specific examples of mitigating circumstances which
the jury may consider in assessing the culpability of the defendant.42
The Washington statute provides for automatic appeal of all death
penalty sentences to the Washington Supreme Court. 4 3 On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court is required to review three issues: First,
whether sufficient evidence existed to justify the jury's determination
of insufficient mitigating circumstances;' second, whether the sentence was a product of passion or prejudice; 45 and third, whether the
sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases considering both the crime and defendant.4 6
C.

The Comparative ProportionalityReview Process

1.

Traditional Versus Comparative Proportionality

In reviewing the appropriateness of a capital sentence, a court may
use two types of proportionality review: Traditional or comparative.4 7
Traditional proportionality review is used by courts to decide whether,
in the abstract, the severity of the punishment is justified by the severity of the crime.4 ' No attempt is made to compare the punishment
given in the case under review to the punishment awarded in similar
cases. It has long been settled that death is not traditionally disproportionate when imposed for the most serious crimes.49 Traditional
proportionality review provides no protection against arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.
Comparative proportionality review is used by courts to prevent
arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty by determining whether the penalty has been applied consistently among similar cases.5 ° The reviewing court examines the penalty in the context of
penalties similar defendants have received for similar offenses. Penalties which are traditionally proportionate may be applied in a comparbeyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence of mitigation does not allow for leniency, the
defendant is automatically sentenced to death. Id. § 10.95.080(1).
42. Id. § 10.95.070 (listing mitigating factors, which include prior criminal record, evidence
of extreme mental disturbance, and age of the defendant).
43. Id. § 10.95.100.
44. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(a).
45. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(c).
46. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(b).
47. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-44 (1984).
48. Id. at 42-43.
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (capital punishment "is an extreme sanction,
suitable to the most extreme of crimes").
50. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43.
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atively disproportionate fashion. In Washington, comparative proportionality review of capital sentences is required by statute.5 1
2.

Washington's ProportionalityChoice

In 1981, the Washington Legislature included a mandatory appellate review provision in its capital punishment statute. 2 By mandating
capital punishment under certain conditions, the legislature implicitly
found the death penalty to be traditionally proportionate for first
degree aggravated murder. 3 Thus, the legislature restricted the
court's analysis of death penalties to a comparative proportionality
review. 4 Presumably, comparative proportionality review was
required to ensure the rational and objective review of each death sentence, and provide an element of procedural fairness that had been
lacking previously in death penalty adjudication. 5
The mandatory comparative proportionality review of a death sentence compels the Washington Supreme Court to determine whether
the death penalty is proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. 6 In conducting
this review, the court must limit its universe of similar cases to those
reported in the Washington Reports or the Washington Appellate
Reports since January 1, 1965 that carried the possibility of a death
penalty. 57 This category includes all cases where first degree aggravated murder was charged; even those cases in which the prosecutor
did not seek the death penalty. 8 Thus, as long as the criminal charge
carried the threat of capital punishment, the court may use the case in
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987). Washington is not alone in its statutory
mandate of comparative proportionality review. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3)
(1982).
52. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.100 (1987)).
53. Washington voters expressed their desire for a mandatory death penalty in a 1975
statewide initiative. 1975-76 Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 17 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9A.32.045-.047 (1977)) (repealed 1981). In 1981, this statute was changed by the legislature
to allow for the death penalty in first degree aggravated murders. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 138,
1981 Wash. Laws 535 (codified at WAH. REV. CODE ch. 10.95 (1987)).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987).
55. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the history of
Washington's death penalty legislation, see Comment, The Death Penalty in Washington: An
HistoricalPerspective, 57 WASH. L. REv. 525 (1982).
56. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987).
57. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(b).
58. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (requiring the universe of possible similar cases to include cases in
which trial court reports are required to be filed); id. § 10.95.120 (mandating the submission of
trial court reports in all cases where the defendant is convicted of aggravated first degree
murder).
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its comparative pool. By requiring that a pool of similar cases serve as
the comparative group, the statute attempts to guide the discretion of
the Washington Supreme Court.
Although the statute defines the universe of cases available for the
review, it does not guide the court in choosing the pool of similar cases
for use in carrying out a particular comparative proportionality
review. The Washington Supreme Court has used at least two methods to define "similar cases" for use in applying the comparative proportionality review. First, the court has looked to the number of
aggravating factors and has chosen cases for the comparative pool
with the same number of aggravating circumstances. 59 Second, the
court has gathered its similar cases according to types of aggravating
circumstances. 60 The court has not adopted a specific methodology
for choosing similar cases to be used in all death penalty reviews.
III.

WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF
COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: A
LACK OF STANDARDS

A review of cases that have undergone comparative proportionality
review 6t reveals that Washington's death penalty statute does not
ensure effective appellate review. The primary flaw is that the statute
does not provide adequate standards or guidance as to its use. The
review procedure has proven problematic for two major reasons.
First, the statute does not adequately define a "similar case.", 62 The
statute's vagueness also makes it difficult to determine which cases
should be included in the comparative pool. The result of the review
can be skewed by including only cases where the death penalty was
upheld. Moreover, the statute does not address how a comparative
proportionality review should be carried out when no similar cases can
59. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 30, 691 P.2d 929, 945-46 (1984) (finding that
no other cases in Washington had the same number of aggravating factors), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1094 (1985).
60. See. e.g., State v. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d 734, 768-69, 743 P.2d 210, 229-30 (1987) (Rupe II)
(finding that only one case contained the same combination of aggravating circumstances, the
court compiled an additional list with cases containing two of the four aggravating factors at
issue), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2834 (1988).
61. Few cases exist with which to analyze the actual effectiveness of Washington's
comparative proportionality system. The limited number of cases, however, does not lessen the
seriousness of the problem. Not only does each case represent the fate of an individual, but
errors occurring at the review stage increase the chances for further error; the system cannot
work if erroneous decisions are used as the benchmark for further comparison.
62. See infra notes 64-98 and accompanying text.
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be found. This problem confronts the court when reviewing cases of
unprecedented aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Second, the statute does not sufficiently define standards for performing the comparative review.6 3 Once the comparative pool is
drawn, the statute lacks sufficient standards with which to conduct the
comparison. Cases can be similar or dissimilar in a variety of ways. It
is not clear which criteria the court must examine and how it should
weigh them in its comparison.
A.

What Is a "Similar Case"?

The major flaw in Washington's comparative proportionality review
system is the lack of a definition of a similar case."4 Washington's statute65 is vague in that it does not define the word "similar," it does not
state how many cases should be included in the review, and it does not
offer a methodology for choosing which cases are to be used in the
comparison. This lack of a practical working definition manifests
itself in each review the court conducts.
L

Lack of Similar Cases: ComparingIncomparables

The first significant problem in deciding on a pool of similar cases is
that no similar cases may exist with which to conduct the comparative
proportionality review. When this occurs, the reviewing court is
tempted to slip into a traditional proportionality review.66 This phenomenon represents the paradox of comparative proportionality
review: the review process often requires the comparison of incomparables.
Aggravated first degree murder cases often present the judge and
jury with grotesque and macabre fact patterns. These cases can be
unique in at least two ways. First, some murders are qualitatively
unique.67 Cases that stand apart, based upon their qualitative unique63. See infra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987).
66. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
67. Heinous murders make the comparison difficult; such cases simply seem worse than
others. The court's proportionality review in State v. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d 577, 625-28, 757 P.2d
889, 915-17 (1988), presents the dilemma of qualitative uniqueness. Rice, in a highly publicized
trial, was convicted of the brutal murders of a prominent Seattle attorney and his family. In its
comparison of Rice's crime with other similar crimes, the court exhibited the shortcomings of the
comparative proportionality procedure. First, only one case, State v. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d 734,
743 P.2d 210 (1987) (Rupe I), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2834 (1988), was found to contain the
same number and type of aggravating circumstances. The other two cases chosen, State v.
Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722, cert denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986), and State v.
Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985), both resulted
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ness, make the compilation of a pool of similar cases difficult. Second,
some murders are quantitatively unique. These cases present to a
reviewing court unprecedented numbers of aggravating factors.6 8
Where a reviewing court chooses to define a similar case based on its
number of aggravating factors, the court may be unable to find such
cases.

69

The question then becomes, how can the court conduct its comparative proportionality review with no similar cases? In State v. Campbell,7" the court conducted its review without a pool of similar cases.
Lacking any cases for its comparison, the court justified its review on a
traditional proportionality theory, finding death to be a fitting punishment for a triple murder.7
Campbell was one of the first cases to be reviewed by the Washington Supreme Court under the revised statute. Charles Campbell,
while an inmate at the Everett Work Release Facility, murdered three
persons.7 2 The state's evidence in the case was quite strong, as was the
evidence of aggravating factors.73 In November 1982, Campbell was
in the imposition of the death penalty. Given the heinous nature of Rice's crime, the court
probably felt constrained to affirm his death penalty on the basis of traditional proportionality.
68. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 30, 691 P.2d 929, 945 (1984) (finding no
other case with four aggravating factors), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
69. The compilation of similar cases and the resultant comparative review usually is based
upon the number of aggravating factors. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. This
simplifies the calculation, and eases the compilation of the pool of similar cases. Consideration of
the crime, however, is just one element of the court's comparative review. The court also must
take account of facts relating to the defendant. Cases like Campbell and Rice appear to be
comparatively proportionate, especially when cases with fewer aggravating circumstances have
resulted in the death penalty. However, differences between defendants may make such cases
more difficult to compare.
In addition, comparative proportionality review mandates a comparison with similar cases.
For example, the court in Rice found that Jeffries was a similar case. However, the court failed
to include cases similar to Jeffries that did not result in the death penalty. Inclusion of these
cases would have changed the comparative proportionality calculus. See infra notes 89-98 and
accompanying text.
70. 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984).
71. Id. at 30, 691 P.2d at 945-46.
72. The first victim had been a previous victim of Campbell's. In 1976, Campbell had been
convicted of the 1974 first degree assault and sodomy of this woman. The second murder victim
had been a witness in that prior trial. The third victim was the daughter of the woman who had
been sodomized and assaulted in 1974. The three were found dead in the same home, all victims
of massive hemorrhage. Apparently, the defendant had used a knife to sever the carotid arteries
of each victim; all three bled to death. Id. at 5-6, 691 P.2d at 933.
73. Id. at 7, 13, 691 P.2d at 933, 937. There were four statutory aggravating factors noted in
this case. The defendant was serving a term of imprisonment at the time of an act resulting in
death (WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020(2) (1987)); the murder was related to the victim's exercise
of official duties (id. at § 10.95.020(6)(b)); the murder was committed to protect the defendant's
identity (id. at § 10.95.020(7)); and the murder was committed in the course of burglary in the
first degree (id. at § 10.95.020(9)(c)).
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convicted on three counts of aggravated first degree murder. Following the jury's finding of insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant leniency, the judge imposed the death penalty against Campbell.74
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and
the sentence.7 5 The majority opinion stated that Campbell presented a
novel issue for the court because it concerned facts which had never
been before the court in a death penalty review.76 The court held that
the penalty imposed was not disproportionate.7 7 Because Campbell's

crime was particularly heinous, the court concluded that most juries
faced with a similar fact pattern would have imposed the death
penalty.

78

The court failed to carry out the comparative proportionality review
as required by the death penalty statute and the Washington Constitution. In analyzing the issue whether the death penalty imposed

against Campbell was proportionate, the court applied only a tradithe majority believed it
tional proportionality analysis. Nevertheless,
79
had carried out its statutory duty.
Traditional proportionality review is not an adequate substitute for
comparative proportionality review. Traditional proportionality
review easily lends itself to the discretionary and ad hoc rationaliza80
tion that comparative proportionality review attempts to prevent. If
the Washington Supreme Court applies only a traditional proportion-

ality review whenever it is faced with unique and extraordinary
crimes, the statutory mandate for a comparative proportionality
review will cease to have meaning 81
74. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 13, 691 P.2d at 937.
75. Id. at 35, 691 P.2d at 948.
76. Id. at 30, 691 P.2d at 945.
77. Id at 30, 691 P.2d at 946.
78. Id. at 30, 691 P.2d at 945.
79. Id. at 34, 691 P.2d at 947.
80. Justice Utter, in his dissenting opinion on the imposition of the death penalty in
Campbell, pointed to a number of factors which make the comparative proportionality review
difficult to administer in less than an arbitrary or meaningless fashion. He pointed out that while
the supreme court is required to consider the weight of mitigating circumstances, the statute
lacks a meaningful definition of the term "mitigating circumstance." Id. at 43, 691 P.2d at 953
(Utter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Also, even assuming the court was certain
what constituted a mitigating circumstance, the statute provides no rational method of weighing
mitigation against aggravation. Id. at 41-44, 691 P.2d at 953-54.
81. See State v. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d 784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1592
(1987). In Harris, the court affirmed the conviction and death sentence against a defendant
charged with a contract killing. In its comparative proportionality review, however, the court
noted that no case had ever been reported in either the Washington Reports or the Washington
Appellate Reports in which the death penalty had been considered for a contract killing. Id. at
798, 725 P.2d at 982. In the three Washington cases involving contract killings, which were
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When the court is faced with quantitatively or qualitatively unique
cases, it faces the possibility of having no similar cases for its comparison." This situation causes the court to lapse into a traditional proportionality review. Because Washington law requires a comparative
proportionality review in every case, and not a traditional proportionality review, the Washington death penalty statute is not being applied
effectively in these unique cases.
2.

Choosing the Comparative Poolfrom the Universe
of Similar Cases

The death penalty statute limits the universe of cases from which to
choose;8 3 it does not, however, guide the court in choosing its comparative pool from the universe of similar cases. Thus, the court may
select and exclude cases as it sees fit. The risk exists that justices will
compile a group of similar cases according to a predetermined outcome. When the only cases used in the comparison are cases where
the death penalty was imposed, it is not surprising that death becomes
a proportionate sentence for the case on review.
In State v. Jeffries,8 4 Patrick Jeffries was charged with and convicted of the first degree aggravated murder of a Clallam County
couple.8" The jury found two aggravating factors: First, the murders
were committed to conceal the commission of a crime, and second, the
killings involved more than one victim and were part of a common
scheme or plan.86 The death penalty was imposed.
described in reports filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.120 (1987), the prosecutor had failed to seek the death penalty. Id. at 799, 725 P.2d at
983. Even though the pool of similar cases did not contain a single case where the death penalty
had been imposed for a contract killing, the court found the death penalty to be comparatively
proportionate. Harris, 106 Wash. 2d at 798-99, 725 P.2d at 983. This result can be explained
only on the basis of a traditional proportionality review.
82. With no cases against which to compare the appealed case, the court arguably is
precluded from carrying out its statutory duty. See, e.g., Harris, 106 Wash. 2d at 798, 725 P.2d
at 982-83.
83.
text.

WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987); see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying

84. 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986).
85. The couple had met Jeffries while he was serving prison time in Canada. After his release,
the couple gave Jeffries a place to stay and a workshop in which to practice his woodcarving.
The relationship was amicable at first, but became less so as time progressed. At some point on
March 19, 1983, Jeffries murdered the couple and buried them in shallow graves near their home.
The facts revealed that the husband was shot first, which alerted the wife that her life was in
danger. She attempted to hide from Jeffries, but he eventually found her. Both were victims of
multiple gunshot wounds. Id. at 401-08, 717 P.2d at 725-29.
86. Id. at 406-07, 717 P.2d at 728.

Washington's Comparative Proportionality Review
The Washington Supreme Court carried out its comparative proportionality review of Jeffries's sentence in summary fashion. The
review of similar cases fills less than one page. In its analysis, the
court selected four cases, all of which affirmed imposition of the death
penalty, to compare with Jeffries's sentence.87 The death penalty was
found to be comparatively proportionate. 8
8 9 in its comparative
The court did not consider State v. Carothers
proportionality review of Jeffries's sentence. Like Jeffries, Carothers
was charged with the aggravated first degree murder of a husband and
wife. Jeffries and Carothers contained identical aggravating factors.
Both cases involved killing more than one victim as part of a common
scheme or plan, and both were committed to conceal the commission
of a crime.9" In both cases, the prosecutor sought the death penalty.9 1

In Jeffries, the jury found insufficient mitigating factors to warrant
leniency, and the court imposed a sentence of death. In Carothers,the
prosecutor sought the death penalty; nevertheless, the jury found sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence less than death.9 2
Other aggravated first degree murder cases with facts similar to
those in Jeffries were not used in the court's comparative proportion-

ality review.93 In these similar cases, the state declined to seek the
87. Id. at 430, 717 P.2d at 740. The four cases used in the comparison were as follows: State
v. Rupe, 101 Wash. 2d 664, 683 P.2d 571 (1984) (Rupe I) (shooting death of two bank tellers
during bank robbery); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984)
(BartholomewII) (victim was killed to hide defendant's identity); State v. Quinlivan, 81 Wash. 2d
124, 499 P.2d 1268 (1972) (defendant murdered his friend and lover's mother), superseded by
statute as noted in State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789, 659 P.2d 488 (1983); State v. Hawkins,
70 Wash. 2d 697, 425 P.2d 390 (1967) (defendant murdered his lover's son and daughter), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 912 (1968).
88. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 430, 717 P.2d at 740.
89. 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). Carothers had an accomplice who had befriended
him while the two served criminal sentences in New York. Upon Carothers's release from
prison, he married and moved to the Seattle area. The other man, Joseph Lalak, later joined him
there. According to Lalak, who was granted immunity in the trial, the two men were driving on
the Olympic Peninsula on September 3, 1971, searching for a place to rob. They came upon the
victims' home. Carothers shot both the husband and wife and stole the man's wallet. Id. at
257-59, 525 P.2d at 732-33.
90. Id.; Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 406-07, 717 P.2d at 728.
91. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 440, 717 P.2d at 746 (Utter, J., dissenting).
92. State v. Carothers, 9 Wash. App. 691, 695, 514 P.2d 170, 173 (1973), aff'd, 84 Wash. 2d
256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974).
93. Justice Utter discussed several double murder cases in his dissent in Jeffries, including the
following: State v. Carey, 42 Wash. App. 840, 714 P.2d 708 (1986) (prosecutor did not seek the
death penalty for the double murder of defendant's wife and son, who were killed in an
intentionally set fire); State v. Guloy, 104 Wash. 2d 412, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1020 (1986); State v. Dictado, 102 Wash. 2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984) (prosecutor did not
seek the death penalty for two defendants charged with the murders of two union reformers); and
State v. Kincaid, 103 Wash. 2d 304, 692 P.2d 823 (1985) (prosecutor did not seek the death
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death penalty. The majority, however, did not include them in the
review.
In Jeffries, the majority misinterpreted the meaning of Washington's death penalty statute by failing to include cases in its comparative proportionality review in which defendants were convicted of
aggravated first degree murder, but were not sentenced to death.9 4
The majority apparently believed that it was not bound to include
such cases. However, the statute requires comparison with those cases
where trial reports have been filed with the supreme court. 95 Because
these reports include all first degree aggravated murder convictions,
even those where the death penalty was not sought by the prosecutor,
all of those cases should have been included in the group of potentially
similar cases. 96 The majority assumed that such reports are filed only
in cases in which the death penalty was sought.97 This error may have
had a dramatic impact on the comparative proportionality review.
Had non-death penalty cases been included in the comparative pool, it
is possible that the majority would have been unable to affirm the sentence so easily because the court gave no reason why Jeffries should be
sentenced when other defendants charged with similar crimes were
not. The omission of these similar cases from the comparison illustrates the lack of standards in composing the comparative pool.
By excluding comparable cases where the death penalty was not
sought, the Washington Supreme Court has failed to comply with the
Washington death penalty statute in its selection of the pool of similar
cases. 9 ' Yet even complying with the statute would not eliminate the
potential for arbitrary application because the statute gives little guidance as to which cases must be chosen from the larger pool. The
court may easily exclude cases which should be included in the comparison. This error predetermines that the death sentence will be
found comparatively proportionate.

penalty for the murder of defendant's wife and her sister). Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 438-39, 717
P.2d at 745 (Utter, J., dissenting).
94. See Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 431-32, 717 P.2d at 742 (Utter, J., dissenting).
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987) (similar cases include those in which reports
have been filed with the supreme court under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.120 (1987)).
96. Id. § 10.95.120.
97. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 429-30, 717 P.2d at 740. But see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.120 (1987) (requiring that reports be submitted from the trial court to the supreme court
"[iln all cases in which a person is convicted of aggravated first degree murder").
98. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.

Washington's Comparative Proportionality Review
B. Making the Comparison:Lack of a Comparative Method
After it has selected a comparative pool, the court must formulate a
model by which cases can be standardized for comparison. The
court's comparative proportionality review might take account of the
facts of the case which relate to both the crime and the defendant, as
well as the number and type of aggravating and mitigating factors.9 9
The statute is unclear as to what evidence the court should consider in
its review. Also, it is uncertain how similar cases which result in different sentencing decisions should be compared and reconciled in the
comparative proportionality review. Without a means to standardize
the differences between cases, the court's comparative review is not
applied effectively.l" °
L

State v. Mak

The difference in treatment of two similarly situated defendants in a
recent Washington murder case illustrates the lack of standards in
Washington's comparative proportionality review procedure. In 1983,
Kwan Fai Mak and Benjamin Ng, along with a third accomplice, perpetrated an execution-style robbery at the Wah Mee Club in Seattle's
International District. 10 1 Both Mak and Ng were charged with thirteen counts of first degree aggravated murder and one count of first
degree assault."0 2 The prosecutor never proved who fired the shots,
03
and argued in both cases that the matter was actually irrelevant.
Mak was convicted and sentenced to death." ° Benjamin Ng, his
accomplice, was convicted of the same crime but escaped the death
sentence.10 5 Thus, only Mak's case was brought to the court on automatic appeal.
99. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
100. The lack of a comparative model is related to the inability to define "similar cases." See
supra text accompanying notes 64-65. It is only after the similar cases are gathered that the
actual comparison between those cases and the case on review can commence.
101. State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 697, 718 P.2d 407, 413, cert denied, 479 U.S. 995
(1986). Thirteen people died as a result of the crime. The victims were held up at gunpoint, hogtied, and then shot dead. Id.
102. State v. Ng, 104 Wash. 2d 763, 765, 713 P.2d 63, 64 (1985); Mak, 105 Wash. 2d at 697,
718 P.2d at 413.
103. Report of Proceedings, State v. Mak, cause 49966-7, at 3102, as cited in Ng, 104 Wash.
2d at 769, 713 P.2d at 66.
104. Mak 105 Wash. 2d at 697, 718 P.2d at 413.
105. Ng, 104 Wash. 2d at 770, 713 P.2d at 67. The jury in Ng's case, under the procedure
described at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060 (1987), was unable to answer unanimously the
question posed by WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4) (1987). See supra note 41.
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On mandatory review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed
Mak's sentence, and found it comparatively proportionate. 11 6 The
court offered two reasons for the discrepancy between Mak's and Ng's
sentences. First, the evidence of mitigation was not the same for each
of the two defendants. 107 Presumably, confronted with the mitigating
evidence that Ng suffered from dementia as a result of a childhood
injury, the jury was unable to reach the unanimous conclusion that
this factor did not warrant leniency.'
Second, the two defendants performed substantially different roles
in the crime.'O9 The majority asserted that evidence presented at trial
tended to prove that Mak was the mastermind behind the killings." 0
These two factors, according to the court, contributed to the difference
in outcomes, and therefore the difference was not considered
"aberrational.""'
2. Problems With the Comparative Review Process
a.

Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstancesin the
Court's Considerationof the Crime and Defendant

Under Washington law, the court must consider both the defendant
and the crime in its comparative proportionality review." 12 An essential component of this analysis is the examination of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Some aggravating and mitigating factors
will relate to the crime, and others will relate to the defendant. The
court has not stated which aggravating and mitigating circumstances
it considers most important. In addition, the court has not made clear
which prong of its comparative proportionality review, the crime or
the defendant, should command the greatest attention.
The court's analysis in State v. Mak illustrates the difficulty in determining whether consideration of the crime or defendant is most
important in its comparative proportionality review. In Mak, the
court recognized that the Mak and Ng crimes were not only similar,
but identical.'
Therefore, in compiling the pool of cases for Mak's
106. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d at 698, 725-26, 718 P.2d at 413, 428.
107. Id. at 724-25, 718 P.2d at 428.
108. The mitigating factor relied on in Ng's case was "[w]hether, at the time of the murder,
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform
his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental
disease or defect" WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(6) (1987).
109. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d at 724-25, 718 P.2d at 428.
110. Id. at 697, 718 P.2d at 413.
111. Id. at 724, 718 P.2d at 428.
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1987).

113. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d at 724, 718 P.2d at 428.

Washington's Comparative Proportionality Review
comparative proportionality review, State v. Ng was the definitive similar case in terms of the crime committed. Because the court was
unable to distinguish the two cases on the basis of the crime, the court
'
shifted its emphasis to the two defendants. 14
No explanation was
given by the court to justify its focus on the differences between the
defendants rather than on the similarities of the crimes.
The court's analysis in Mak also illustrates the difficulty in weighing
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court found that evidence of Ng's mental illness 11 5 contributed to the discrepancy in sentencing.1 16 This evidence created a relevant and important distinction
between the two defendants. Nevertheless, the court did not indicate
how it weighed the mitigating circumstances. Thus, insofar as the
court considered the defendant, the court did not create a principled
means to compare cases which may contain different mitigating
circumstances.
b. Evidence Which the Court Considers
The result of the comparative proportionality review depends, at
least in part, upon what evidence the court considers in its review.
The death penalty statute does not state which evidence is to be considered. When the court conducts the comparative proportionality
review of a death sentence, it should consider all available relevant
evidence. At a minimum, the court should promulgate standards to
determine what evidence should be considered in its comparative proportionality review.
In Mak, the court emphasized the state's claim that the "respective
roles" of the defendants were different, contributing to the imposition
of different sentences.1 7 However, evidence excluded at Mak's trial
might have convinced the jury that Mak did not assume the lead role
in the crime. 1 " The evidence might have made Mak less culpable, and
114. In previous cases, the nature of the crime had been paramount in the court's
comparative review. See generally State v. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d 577, 757 P.2d 889 (1988); State v.
Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
115. Mal4 105 Wash. 2d at 725, 718 P.2d at 428.
116. Id. at 724-25, 718 P.2d at 428.
117. Id. at 725, 718 P.2d at 428.
118. This evidence concerned allegations of a further accomplice, who had approached Ng
and offered to sell him a bulletproof vest. Id. at 716, 718 P.2d at 424. In addition, Mak claimed
that the evidence would prove that this third party was a "banker" for a local gambling club, and
had a plan to control the gambling in the International District. Supposedly, Ng had been
contacted by this third party on the day of the crime, and had been with him for an hour before
the murders. Id at 716, 718 P.2d at 423.
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thus a less likely candidate for the death penalty." 9 Although the
Washington Supreme Court was aware that this evidence existed, 2 '
the court did not state whether it considered the evidence in carrying
out the comparative proportionality review. After Mak, it is unclear
what evidence the court will consider in its comparative proportionality review.
c. Determining When the Death Penalty Is Comparatively
Proportionate
The Washington Supreme Court must decide whether the sentence
imposed is comparatively proportionate to other similar cases. It is
unclear whether the penalty must have been imposed in a majority of
the cases in the comparative pool, or whether a lesser percentage will
suffice. For example, if the comparative pool contains three cases in
which the death penalty was imposed and three cases in which it was
not imposed, is the imposition of the death penalty in the case being
reviewed comparatively proportionate? 2 '
The result of the Mak comparative proportionality review makes it
difficult to predict whether the death sentence will be comparatively
proportionate for a future similar case.' 2 2 The future case will have
facts relating to the crime and the defendant which will differ in some
respects from the facts in Mak and Ng. Reconciling Mak, Ng, and the
future case will be difficult without standards to make the comparison.
IV. TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE COMPARATIVE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
A comparative proportionality review necessitates a review of the
facts relating to the crime, the defendant, the aggravating circumstances, and the mitigating circumstances. Neither the Washington
Supreme Court nor the death penalty statute, however, provides a
model for making the comparison. The court has not determined
119. "Neither we, nor Mak, will ever know. Mak, however, has less time to speculate about
the possibility." Id. at 769, 718 P.2d at 451 (Utter, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 715, 718 P.2d at 423.
121. The problem would be even more complicated than it first appears. In addition to
distinguishing the death and non-death halves of the comparative pool, the court would also need
to distinguish the cases within each half upon their individual combinations of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.
122. There would seem to be little that could be said that might convince a jury that one
who participated in the killing of 13 people should have his life spared. And yet, under the
bizarre facts of this case, two of the three participants in this crime have been spared the
death penalty ....
Only one actor in this most brutal of all killings committed within this
state received the death penalty.
Mak 105 Wash. 2d at 763, 718 P.2d at 448 (Utter, J., dissenting).

Washington's Comparative Proportionality Review
which factors are most important, or how the relevant factors are to be
compared with one another. Because the court has failed to adopt
standards for its comparative proportionality review, the statute is not
being effectively applied to eliminate the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. Thus, continued use of the comparative proportionality
review violates the Washington Constitution's prohibition of cruel
12 3
punishment.

Comparative proportionality review is a promising concept, but the
method by which it is imposed in Washington needs improvement.
Because the death penalty statute does not provide sufficient direction
for its use, the court should formulate its own guidelines. The following suggestions would result in a more effectively applied comparative
proportionality review procedure.
The statute presently requires the court to conduct a comparative
proportionality review in all cases where a defendant has been sentenced to death. Some cases are exceedingly difficult to compare, but
this cannot excuse the court from its lawful duty. A traditional proportionality review is insufficient under the Washington statute. The
statute requires that the court choose a comparative pool, and then
carry out a meaningful comparative proportionality review.
The court should articulate a standard for weighing the relative
importance of the characteristics of the crime and of the defendant in
choosing and comparing similar cases. In addition, the court should
announce which aggravating and mitigating circumstances are more
important than others, and explain how it weighs different aggravating
and mitigating circumstances against one another. These proposals
remedy the statutory deficiencies, which presently act to undermine
the statute's effectiveness in preventing arbitrary punishments.
The court should determine the number of similar cases necessary
to conduct an effective review. Comparative proportionality reviews
which use only a small number of cases lack an appearance of fairness.
A large pool provides the court with a better indication of the comparative proportionality of a death sentence imposed for a particular
crime and defendant. The comparative pool always should include
similar non-death penalty cases. Failure to do so predetermines that
death will be found comparatively proportionate. The court also
should explain how it will carry out its comparison when some similar
cases involved imposition of the death penalty and some did not.
Finally, the court should determine what evidence it will consider in
its comparative proportionality review. Where a defendant faces the
123. See supra note 33.
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imposition of the death penalty, the court should examine all available
relevant evidence in conducting its review, even evidence which was
properly excluded from the jury at trial. The seriousness of the penalty mandates such a thorough analysis.
V.

CONCLUSION

Washington's comparative proportionality review procedure has
failed to provide a principled and effective means for the appellate
review of death sentences. Although the goals of the review process
are laudable, its use has not provided a meaningful safeguard against
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Instead, the review represents a procedural smoke screen that obscures the flaws in the capital punishment scheme.
The primary problem with Washington's comparative proportionality review procedure is that Washington's capital punishment statute
lacks a sufficiently clear definition of a similar case and the court so far
has failed to provide one. Related problems include the comparison of
quantitative or qualitatively unique cases, the composition of the comparative pool, and the comparison process itself.
The Washington Supreme Court has not examined its comparative
proportionality review for actual effectiveness. The Washington Constitution's prohibition against cruel punishment requires that it do so.
Until the Washington Supreme Court examines the review process for
actual effectiveness as applied, the death penalty should be struck
down as violative of the Washington Constitution.
W. Ward Morrison, Jr.

